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Female track athletes with certain differences of sex development (DSD) are now
barred from the women’s category of international competition – that is, unless
they undergo procedures to “normalise” the atypically high amount of testosterone
produced by their bodies. These regulations establish an exception to the general
rule that the women’s category is open to all athletes – just as they are – who
have been legally recognised from birth as female (a separate exception applies to
transgender athletes). They also override domestic law by creating the concept of
“sport sex”, which doesn’t necessarily correspond with legal sex assigned at, and
ever since, birth.
International legal norms have been invoked both to support and to challenge these
regulations. The global sport governing body responsible for the regulations – World
Athletics – asserts that the principle of equality and non-discrimination, which is
enshrined in its Constitution, requires that women with DSD be treated differently
from women without DSD. According to World Athletics, this is because they are
different, in the same way that men and women are considered different for the
purposes of sport. But a wide range of organizations specialised in human rights,
health and medicine, and women’s sport disagree. UN human rights experts, among
others, have indicated that the regulations appear to contravene the internationally
recognised human rights of women with DSD, including not only the right to equality
and non-discrimination, but also the rights to the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health, to physical and bodily integrity, and to freedom from
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and harmful practices.
The debate about the regulations remains unresolved in part because of the
traditional boundaries of international law. As the co-editors of the Research
Handbook on Feminist Engagement with International Law, Kate Ogg and Susan
Harris Rimmer, explain, this is precisely where feminist thought has something to
offer:
While mainstream international law scholarship accepts and works within the
boundaries of international law’s fundamental concepts and structures, feminist
scholarship questions international law’s norms and hierarchies as well as what is
deemed to be within and outside the sphere of international law and the processes
through which these distinctions are made.
Such feminist engagement with international law is necessary to move beyond the
current impasse over female eligibility regulations in athletics. In particular, further
structural and conceptual development is needed either to rethink the public/private
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and male/female dualisms that frame the debate or to move beyond such dualisms
altogether.
International law beyond the public/private binary
The debate about female eligibility in athletics reveals the futility of the structural
distinction between private and public international law in contexts like sport,
where private governing bodies act like, interact with, and often override, state
governments. In her keynote address featured in the Handbook, Sima Samar
observes that international law has become more responsive to women’s rights
by recognising state responsibility for violations by non-state actors. Handbook
contributor Beth Goldblatt discusses this obligation in relation to gender-based
violence, including coercive acts that subject women to physical, sexual or
psychological harm. The application of these general international legal principles in
the context of sport, however, remains unclear.
World Athletics – the “sole competent international authority for the sport of Athletics
worldwide” – adamantly denies any responsibility to respect international human
rights law on the basis that it “is not a public authority exercising state powers, but
rather a private body exercising private (contractual) powers”. Therefore, says World
Athletics, “it is not subject to human rights instruments”. These contractual powers
arise primarily from its Constitution, which binds all national athletics federations –
and thus, anyone, anywhere, who wishes to participate in competitive athletics –
to comply with all rules made by World Athletics. The Constitution also stipulates
that any dispute about these rules must be resolved by private arbitration before the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), to the exclusion of any other forum.
Accordingly, two affected athletes – Dutee Chand and Caster Semenya – have
challenged female eligibility regulations before the CAS. Although their claims
included alleged violations of (public) international human rights law, their cases
were decided solely on the basis of (private) sports law, namely the World Athletics
Constitution and the Olympic Charter. According to the most recent CAS decision,
this is because the question of whether the regulations are compatible with human
right law “will ultimately be a matter for the courts of the various jurisdictions in
question to determine”. World Athletics, however, asserts the opposite, claiming that
the human rights question has been definitively settled by the CAS:
We would defend any claim that was made in any national or international forum as
we would any other challenge (including if necessary on jurisdictional grounds) …
CAS is competent to rule on all legal claims, including human rights claims, and it did
so in its recent ruling, in favour of [World Athletics].
This paradox suggests that the boundaries of international law must move beyond
the public/private (and domestic/international) binary, into the hybrid realm of
transnational, supranational or global law where private and public activities and
interests collide. An “either/or” approach is insufficient to answer questions about
how responsibilities should be shared among states and sport governing bodies, and
their respective judicial institutions, to ensure universal protection of human rights in
sport. Do these entities need to be reformed, linked, complemented or replaced? Is
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human rights even a useful framework in hybrid contexts like sport? These structural
questions present a ripe challenge and opportunity for feminist engagement with
international law.
Gender equality beyond the male/female binary
The debate about female eligibility regulations in athletics also reveals the
indeterminacy of concepts like “gender equality” in international law, particularly
when non-binary sex or gender is contemplated. In the Handbook, Ramji-Nogales
revisits the category “women” as a political tool for solidarity and inclusion, while
Emma Larking notes that “gender-based marginalisation affects all those whose
gender identity unsettles established categories, including transsexual and intersex
people”. Kathryn McNeilly proceeds from a non-binary understanding of sex and
gender in her chapter on “queering the foundations of human rights”, while Giovanna
Maria Frisso emphasises the need for intersectional and “decolonial” understandings
of discrimination in order to address a broader range of embodied experiences in
international law.
The need for such bridge-building between feminism and other critical perspectives,
such as queer theory and third world approaches to international law (TWAIL),
is evident in the case of World Athletics’ female eligibility regulations; they target
women whose bodies do not fit neatly into a binary conception of sex and have come
to be applied primarily to women of colour from the “global south”. World Athletics
maintains that its regulations are “neither racist nor sexist” and the regulations’
explanatory notes insist that they are “in no way … intended as any kind of judgment
or questioning of the sex or the gender identity of any athlete”. Nonetheless, the
impact of the regulations is felt disproportionately by a certain subset of women.
Underlying the position of World Athletics is not only a binary conceptualisation
of sex, but an understanding of sex and gender as entirely distinct. As Hilary
Charlesworth notes in the Foreword of the Handbook, however, this distinction often
raises the “spectre of essentialism”:
Toril Moi has suggested that distinguishing sex and gender is not always productive
in feminist thought, especially as a basis for understanding subjectivity. She draws
on Simone de Beauvoir’s observation in The Second Sex that ‘one is not born a
woman, rather we become one’ to suggest that the body should be understood as a
situation, rather than a biological entity.
The recent decision of the CAS does not address the overlap of the biological
and the social, but rather sustains the paradox: On the one hand, the panel
acknowledged that Caster Semenya was born and raised, has lived and run, and
has always identified and been recognised in law “as a woman”. On the other hand,
it concluded that her participation in the women’s category subverts fair competition,
thereby implying that she is not a woman (at least in the context of sport). Otherwise,
her sporting success would be a win, not a loss, for women’s sport and for gender
equality more broadly.
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Do women with and without DSD necessarily have “incompatible, competing rights”,
as the CAS panel determined they do? Should gender equality be considered on an
individual or collective basis? Is it productive to define sex/gender differently based
on context? Further feminist engagement with international law is needed to answer
these questions, and also to escape the double bind according to which gender
equality is achieved by “protecting” women from men (and “insufficiently female”
women) on the basis that the former are naturally inferior to the latter (or else they
must not be women after all).
Feminism has already identified the problems with binaries, but further conceptual
and structural development is necessary to move beyond them so that international
law can meet people where they are and as they are, including in the fluid spaces
between the public and the private, the male and the female.
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